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 Moreover, the court’s concern about delaying the case was illogical and1
unreasonable because the court couldn’t hear the motion for 13 days anyway and
the investigation could have been completed by then, especially as it appears that
both witnesses lived locally.
1
II.  ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.  The District Court Abused its Discretion When Denying Mr. Adams’s
Motion for Investigative Services. 
It was an abuse of discretion to deny Mr. Adams’s motion for investigative
services and it was manifestly unfair to dismiss the causes of action which the court
did not grant Mr. Adams the resources to investigate.
The state attempts to justify the court’s ruling by noting that the motion was
filed “[t]hirteen days before the hearing on the state’s motion for summary
dismissal.”  State’s Brief, pg. 21.  In fact, the state’s motion was heard 26 days later,
on June 23, 2014.  R 1855.  Moreover, when Mr. Adams filed his motion on May 28,
2014, the state had not yet set a hearing date on its motion. R 1812.  No hearing
date was set until June 10, 2014, the day of the hearing on Mr. Adams’s motion for
investigative services.  Thus, the state’s motion was never set for a hearing until
after the court had already denied Mr. Adams’s request. R 1825; T (6/10/2014) pg.
12, ln. 10-12; pg. 15, ln. 1-2.  The denial of the motion cannot be justified by “the
imminent hearing date on the state’s motion” (State’s Brief, pg. 22) because that
date hadn’t been set.   And, of course, the court could have set the hearing on the
state’s motion out far enough to give plenty of time for investigation, had it wanted
to do so.   It just didn’t need to do so because it had already denied Mr. Adams’s1
2motion.
By focusing on the timing of the motion and counsel’s failure to set out in
detail what steps she had taken to locate the witnesses, the court failed to consider
the legal issue before it: Whether the requested investigative funds was “necessary
to protect [Mr. Adams’s] substantial rights.”  Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148,
139 P.3d 741, 750 (Ct. App. 2006); see Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 375, 825 P.2d
94, 98 (Ct. App. 1992) (discovery request).
The state argues that Mr. Adams’s substantial rights were not adversely
affected “for the same reasons Adams’ claim that his trial counsel performance
failed to meet the prejudice prong under Strickland – that Lynette Skeen and Crissy
Powell’s statements were irrelevant and/or inadmissible[.]” State’s Brief, pg. 23. 
But that argument does not make sense.  If the evidence already in Mr. Adams’s
possession was inadequate to establish a prima facie case, the motion should have
been granted as further investigation had the potential to produce additional
relevant, admissible evidence.  By the state’s own logic, locating the witnesses and
obtaining affidavits was necessary to protect Mr. Adams’s substantive rights
because the IAC claims based upon failure to investigate these witnesses were
insufficient to survive summary disposition.  Mr. Adams needed the investigative
services so he could produce evidence to counter the state’s argument and the
court’s eventual finding that the failure to call Ms. Powell and Ms. Skeen as
witnesses was trial strategy by producing an affidavit that the defense never
3contacted them. The reasons why the evidence available was sufficient to require
additional investigation is set forth below.      
B. The trial court erred in dismissing causes of action E (the failure to call
Crissy Powell as a witness) and F (failure to call Lynette Skeen as a
witness).
Crissy Powell was at the Dutch Goose prior to the stabbing and observed that
Tyler Gorley was “rude and a jerk and he was looking for a fight all night and called
her the town whore.”  R1 376 (Exhibit L to pro se petition).  Lynette Skeen said in
her witness statement that she saw car headlights at the fight scene and heard
someone yell, “Get the Fuck back here.”  She then heard the car drive off as she
called 911. (A copy of Ms. Skeen’s witness statement was attached to the pro se
petition as Exhibit M-4.  R1, 393.) According to Officer’s Schorzman’s report, the
events happened so quickly Ms. Skeen did not even have time to make contact with
911 before Mr. Adams drove away. 
Lynette said she heard  a commotion outside her house and it woke her
up. She looked outside and saw one car parked in the road with it’s
lights pointing east. She said she heard men arguing and heard one
say “get the fuck back over here.”  Lynette then called 911. She saw
the car drive away and decided to hang up while 911 was still dialing.
R1, 394.  Their testimony would have shown that Mr. Gorley was the aggressor in
the fight and was still willing and able to fight at the time Mr. Adams was getting
in his car and driving away.  It also would have supported Mr. Adams’s testimony
that he was the one attacked and acted in self-defense.
The court summarily dismissed the Crissy Powell claim finding that: 1) “this
 Likewise, the state’s contention that the evidence was not admissible as2
character evidence is also a strawman argument as the evidence would not have
been offered to prove Mr. Gorley’s character for violence, but his aggressive state of
mind that particular evening.  See State’s Brief, pg. 17.
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appears to be an issue strategy for defense counsel;” 2) “Mr. Adams has failed to
show that Powell's testimony would have changed the course of the criminal case or
the outcome of the trial;” 3) “Mr. Adams has failed to show that Powell would have
testified consistently with what his sister has stated nor that she was even
available to testify.”  T (6-23-14) pg. 64, ln. 15 -pg. 65, ln. 22.  The state makes a
different argument on appeal: That Ms. Powell’s statements were not admissible
evidence.  State Brief, pg. 16-17.  But her observations of Mr. Gorley at the bar, i.e.,
that he was “rude and a jerk and he was looking for a fight all night,” were relevant
and admissible because they showed Mr. Gorley’s aggressive state of mind and
corroborated Mr. Adams’s testimony that Mr. Gorley started the fight between them
a short time later.  I.R.E. 401.  The Court has recognized “four well-defined
categories in which a declarant-victim’s state of mind is relevant because of its
relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties,” including “when the
defendant claims self-defense as justification for the killing.”  State v. Abdullah, 158
Idaho 386, 435, 348 P.3d 1, 50 (2015), reh’g denied (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
1161 (2016), quoting. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 364, 247 P.3d 582, 591
(2010).  Of course, Mr. Gorley’s statement that Crissy Powell was “the town whore”
was not “hearsay in need of an exception” as claimed by the state as it would not be
offered for the truth of the matter asserted.  I.R.E. 801(c).   The statement was2
5relevant because it was a concrete example of Mr. Gorley’s rude and aggressive
behavior.  
As to the Lynette Skeen claim, the court found: 1) “this was an issue of
strategy for defense counsel” and “Mr. Onanubosi made the tactical decision not to
call Lynette Skeen;” 2) “Petitioner failed to show that Skeen’s testimony would have
changed the course of the criminal case or the outcome of the trial;” 3) “Petitioner
has not shown that Skeen would have testified consistently with his version of the
events nor that she was even available.”  T (6-23-14) pg. 66, ln. 6-24.  However, as
previously noted, the court’s finding that defense counsel made a strategic decision
to not call the witnesses is not based upon any evidence in the record.  Defense
counsel testified he did not recall Crissy Powell or know Lynette Skeen. 
(Augmented Record, Onanubosi Deposition, pg. 39, ln. 21- pg. 41, ln. 24.)  He did not
testify that he decided to not investigate or not call these witnesses as a matter of
strategy or tactics.
The state argues that “based upon [the state’s version of] the facts of the case,
the assertion that Gorley was the person who yelled, ‘Get the Fuck back here’ runs
counter to common sense and logic.”  State’s Brief, pg. 18.  The assertion does make
sense in light of Mr. Adams’s testimony that he was attacked by Mr. Maylin and
that Mr. Gorley joined in the attack, and it would have corroborated Mr. Adams’
statement to the police that he “began to back up towards [his] car that when [Tyler
Gorley] said ‘Get the Fuck back here, I am not done with you yet.’” R3 1814. 
Additionally, it is obvious that Mr. Adams was leaving the scene as Ms. Skeen
6heard the car drive off after that statement.  The statement could not have been
made by Mr. Adams because he was removing himself from the fight by driving
away.
The state’s argument that “[t]here is no basis for concluding . . . that Chrissy
Powell or Lynette Skeen could have added any information to their statements,”
(State’s Brief, pg. 18) is inadequate for two reasons.  First, they both should have
been called simply on the basis of the content of their statements.  Their testimony
would have supported Mr. Adams’s testimony that Mr. Gorley was the aggressor
and that he was acting in self-defense.  The absence of their testimony was
prejudicial because the jury might have had a reasonable doubt about whether Mr.
Adams’s was acting unlawfully, i.e., without legal justification or excuse, an element
of both murder and battery.  ICJI 704A; 1203.  Second, there is no way to know
what further investigation would have shown had it been conducted by trial counsel
or permitted by the post-conviction court.   
In conclusion, all the court’s reasons for dismissing Claims E and F are
inadequate because they are not supported by the record or the court erred by not
giving Mr. Adams the means by which to establish the necessary facts to avoid
summary disposition.
C.  The court erred by dismissing Claim M.  Counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to the paramedic’s testimony that Mr. Maylin suffered a stab
wound.  The evidence was not admissible and there is no strategic reason
for allowing the evidence to come in.
The state does not address this claim in its brief.  Consequently, no reply is
7needed.
D.  The trial court erred in dismissing the IAC claim based on counsel’s
failure to seek independent DNA testing of Tyler Gorley’s clothing and then
by denying the motion to reconsider.
The state argues that the absence of Mr. Maylin’s DNA on Mr. Gorley’s
clothing “does not show Maylin was not stabbed first [or] . . . was not stabbed by a
knife at all.”  State’s Brief, pg. 26.  However, evidence to be relevant does not need to
conclusively prove a fact.  It just needs to have “any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.” I.R.E. 401.  Here, the absence of Mr.
Maylin’s DNA has a tendency to prove he was not stabbed as he tried to get out of the
car and was fleeing from Mr. Adams, as Mr. Maylin claimed.  Dr. Hampikian’s
affidavit, which at this point must be construed in the light most favorable to Mr.
Adams, stated that he “would expect to find DNA on an object or weapon after it
punctured a person and caused extensive bleeding.”  In fact, “it is extremely unlikely
that DNA would not be found on that object or weapon.”  R3 1906.  While the state
suggests that Dr. Hampikian may not have expertise in the “transfer of DNA,” his CV
shows that he is a member of the American Academy of Forensic Science, teaches
classes in Forensic Biology, focuses his research on forensic casework analysis, and
had taught police and crime lab workers in DNA analysis. Id.
The state argues, as it did below, that the “testing site selection” may explain
the absence of Maylin’s DNA because there were four stab wounds to the torso.  Thus, 
8the four test sites on the T-shirt and jacket could have been from the same two
wounds.  State’s Brief, pg. 27.  The state also speculates without any evidentiary
support that Mr. Adams wiped the knife blade after stabbing Mr. Maylin but before
stabbing Mr. Gorley.  At this point, however, these theories hold no sway because on
summary disposition the evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to
Mr. Adams.  Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007); Kelly
v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010).
E.  The court erred by dismissing Claim Q: counsel was ineffective for
conceding Mr. Adams was guilty of manslaughter in closing argument
without consulting Mr. Adams or seeking his permission.
The state argues that trial counsel did not abandon the self-defense theory of
the case.  However, the district court found otherwise: “From the record I reviewed,
the statements of counsel were strategically designed to minimize the charges against
his client.”  T (6/23/14), pg. 79, ln. 1-17.  But that is precisely the error.  Mr. Adams
did not want to minimize the charge, he wanted to be acquitted because he acted in
self-defense.  He stated that “[a]t no time . . . did I give consent to my trial counsel . . .
to change my trial strategy of self-defense.  I’m not guilty of any crime and have
remained adamant about that fact since the beginning.”  R1 1366.  Mr. Adams was
willing to run the risk of conviction in exchange for the chance of acquittal and thus
did not give his attorney permission to pursue the voluntary manslaughter strategy. 
Trial counsel did not attempt to obtain an acquittal based upon self-defense. 
His argument to the jury was that the fight was a “sudden quarrel that rises to the
9heat of passion . . . and the end result was tragedy, deadly.” T pg. 947, ln. 23 - pg.
948, ln. 1.  He repeated this phrase five more times during closing argument, four of
which he noted that death was the result.  T pg. 948, ln 12-20 (“We call it a sudden
quarrel that rises to the level of heat of passion among a group of people.); T pg. 955,
ln. 25 - pg. 956, ln. 2. (“This is a fight, a sudden quarrel that rises to the level of a
heat of passion among a group of people that night that turned deadly.”); T pg. 963,
ln. 4-6 (“This is a fight, a sudden quarrel that rises to the heat of passion . . . that
turned deadly.”);  T pg. 966, ln. 12-15 (“This is a fight, a sudden quarrel that rise to
the level of heat of passion . . . and the end result was tragedy, deadly, I concede.”);  T
pg. 967, ln. 15-18. (“This is a fight, a sudden quarrel that rises to the heat of passion .
. . that turned deadly.”).  The “sudden quarrel” phrase was used six times by counsel
and was taken directly from the voluntary manslaughter jury instructions given by
the court.  T pg. 909, ln. 21 - pg. 910, ln. 24.  ICJI 708.  In his conclusion, trial counsel
does not mention self-defense.  Instead he only argues that Mr. Adams is not guilty of
first-degree murder because there was no robbery.  T pg. 970, ln. 15 - pg. 971, ln. 12.
This argument left the jury to choose between second-degree murder or voluntary
manslaughter.  The fact that the jury returned a second degree murder verdict does
not disprove trial counsel abandoned Mr. Adams’s self-defense theory by arguing for a
lesser-included, as claimed by the court and the state.  State’s Brief, pg. 33.  (The
illogic of this argument is manifest.  If anything, the verdict tends to prove that
counsel argued for second-degree murder.)  Nor does the fact that the jury rejected
trial counsel’s voluntary manslaughter concession mean he did not make that
  http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/argument 3
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concession.  A not guilty verdict would not mean the state conceded Mr. Adams was
innocent.
Trial counsel did not need to say the words “find my client guilty of voluntary
manslaughter” in order to make it clear he was conceding that point.  As found by the
district court, it was trial counsel’s strategy to minimize the conviction.  That was the
entire point of counsel’s beating the phrase “sudden quarrel . . . that turned deadly”
like a drum.  Thus, the state’s claim that the record does not show “any actual
concession by counsel to the voluntary manslaughter claim” is conclusively disproved
by the record.  State’s Brief, pg. 32.  The concession was actual even if not explicit.
Nor does the fact that counsel set out a self-defense theory in opening
statement prove he did not abandon that claim in closing argument.  What the
opening statement and Mr. Adams’s testimony (at trial and in post-conviction) prove
is that Mr. Adams wanted to put on a self-defense case, trial counsel agreed to do so,
but then abandoned that defense during closing arguments without obtaining Mr.
Adams’s permission.  And by that time it was too late for Mr. Adams to raise an
objection.
Finally, defense counsel’s desultory references to self-defense during his closing
remarks were not “argument,” i.e., “a coherent series of statements leading from a
premise to a conclusion.”   The portion of the closing argument quoted by the state is3
 “You know, I told you talking about self-defense, you know, hindsight is4
good, 20-20 is good.  It describes what happened where he was.  I wasn’t there. 
They were not there.  But one thing we know for sure is there is testimony about
two people swinging at one another.”  If this is a self-defense argument, it is
impossible to tell whether Mr. Adams or Mr. Gorley is the one who is “swinging” in
self-defense.  Perhaps the jury thought counsel was saying that Mr. Gorley was
defending himself from Mr. Adams who attacked him upon sudden quarrel or while
in the heat of passion.
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nearly incoherent.  State’s Brief, pg 35, quoting T pg 964, ln. 15-18.   Counsel follows4
up those comments by telling the jury that Mr. Adams testified about “how he felt”
and “[t]hat’s why we have that self-defense instruction,” but then immediately tells
the jury to ignore Mr. Adams’s testimony because “[t]his is a fight, a sudden quarrel
that rise to the level of heat of passion . . . and the end result was tragedy, deadly, I
concede.”  T pg. 966, ln. 2-15.  And while counsel mentions the self defense jury
instructions, he never asked the jury to return a not guilty verdict to the homicide or
battery charge because Mr. Adams was acting in self-defense.  Counsel only asked the
jury to find that Mr. Adams was not “a murderer, a first-degree murderer,” (T pg.
971, ln. 7-12) while he previously and repeatedly insisted Mr. Adams acted upon a
sudden quarrel or heat of passion.  That’s not a self-defense argument.  That’s a plea
to find Mr. Adams is guilty of voluntary manslaughter made without Mr. Adams’s
permission.  This was highly prejudicial because Mr. Onanubosi’s argument led the
jury to the second-degree murder verdict as Mr. Adams did not testify in support of
the manslaughter theory.
As the state relies solely upon the argument that counsel did not abandon the
self-defense case, it does not address those cases which state that counsel may not
  The state also draws the Court’s attention to a footnote in Abdullah5
collecting cases.  State’s Brief, pg. 33, ft. 18.  However, all those cases are capital
cases or decided prior to Florida v. Nixon, or both.
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concede guilt without consulting with the client and obtaining permission. United
States v. Thomas, 417 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9  Cir. 2005) (B. Fletcher, concurring); Unitedth
States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070 (9  Cir. 1991); State v. Wiplinger, 343 N.W.2d 858,th
861 (Minn. 1984); see also, People v. Hattery, 488 N.E.2d 513, 519 (Ill. 1985); Cooke v.
State, 977 A.2d 803, 829 (Del. 2009) cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1506 (2010).
The state’s citation to Abdullah, supra, is not apposite.  First, Abdullah
recognizes that the accused has the ultimate authority to decide whether to plead
guilty.  158 Idaho at 505, 348 P.3d at 120, citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751
(1983). Second, while Abdullah’s trial counsel did not put on an alibi defense, they did
not concede guilt to an included offense like Mr. Adams’s attorney. They only
admitted the fact that Mr. Abdullah was present in Boise at the time of the house fire
and argued that Mr. Abdullah was not guilty of murder because the victim committed
suicide.  They did not argue that he was guilty of arson or felony-murder.  Thus,
Abdullah is not a concession of guilt case, like this one.  Moreover, as previously
noted, the United States Supreme Court has carved out an exception in capital cases
where the concession of guilt may or may not be deficient performance but is not per
se prejudicial because of the focus on sentencing in death penalty cases.  See, Florida
v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004).  But Nixon was careful to distinguish capital cases
from “a run-of-the mine trial” like this one. 543 U.S. at 190-1.5
13
As noted by the Supreme Court, 
It can hardly be questioned that closing argument serves to sharpen and
clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal case. For
it is only after all the evidence is in that counsel for the parties are in a
position to present their respective versions of the case as a whole. Only
then can they argue the inferences to be drawn from all the testimony,
and point out the weaknesses of their adversaries’ positions. And for the
defense, closing argument is the last clear chance to persuade the trier of
fact that there may be reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).  Defense counsel’s argument did not
sharpen or clarify Mr. Adams’s claim of self-defense.  Instead, the argument muddled
and undermined Mr. Adams’s chosen complete defense to the murder and battery
charges with a plea that the jury find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter.  Trial
counsel literally gambled with Mr. Adams’s life with his lesser-offense strategy even
though, outside of capital cases, defense counsel cannot make the decision to concede
guilt without first consulting with and obtaining the permission of his client. 
Summary disposition of this claim should be reversed.
F.  Alternatively, the Cumulative Effect of All the Instances of Deficient
Performance Prejudiced Petitioner so That He Was Denied his Sixth
Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel Under Strickland v.
Washington
With regard to cumulative error, the state contends that Mr. Adams has not
shown two acts of deficient performance.  State’s Brief, pg. 36.  That claim is incorrect
as explained in the Opening Brief and above.  Also, as previously set forth, there is a
reasonable probability of a different result had defense counsel’s performance been
constitutionally adequate. 
14
III.  CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and above, Mr. Adams asks this
Court to reverse the summary dismissal of the amended petition and remand the
matter for an evidentiary hearing.  
Respectfully submitted this 22  day of July, 2016.nd
__/s/___________________________
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Clayton Adams
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